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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-DUTY OF EMPLOYER To FURNISH 
INFORMATION RELATING To ABILITY To PAY-A regional negotiating com-
mittee of the International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, sent 
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questionnaires to some six hundred employers with whom it had bargain-
ing relations.1 The committee desired information to assist in measuring 
wage demands for bargaining with employers in the Pacific northwest lum-
ber and plywood industries. The information requested related to each 
employee, his job classification, hourly rates, seniority rights, paid holi-
days, vacations, and annual hours. The employers were also requested to 
furnish figures showing the annual board-foot production of their re-
spective operation~ and related sales totals expressed in dollars. The em-
ployers declined to provide the data despite repeated requests from the 
union. After negotiations had commenced and the employers still refused, 
the union filed charges before the NLRB of an unfair labor practice under 
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.2 The Trial Examiner found that the re-
fusal to supply the requested information was a refusal to bargain col-
lectively. Held, the employers violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to furnish 
the individual wage and employment information. Although this infor-
mation was requested by the international union, it was intended to be 
used by the locals. There was no violation, however, in refusing to pro• 
vide the production and sales totals since the employers at no time claimed 
inability to pay the wage demands. Pine Industrial Relations Committee, 
Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 40 L.R.R.M. 1315 (1957).8 
The principal decision is the first to hold expressly that an employer 
need not produce financial data4 unless he has claimed inability to pay as 
a defense to the union's wage demands. This rule is to be contrasted with 
the development in the wage data area.5 Initially a refusal by an employer 
to furnish wage data was regarded only as evidence of bad faith.6 Subse-
quently, emphasis was put on the duty to provide wage information upon 
request when the union could show it to be relevant to the bargaining is-
sues.7 Finally, wage data was recognized as the crux of collective bargain-
ing and no showing of specific relevance to particular bargaining issues was 
1 Various local unions had delegated certain bargaining functions to the regional 
committee. 
2 It is an unfair labor practice for the employer " ... to refuse to bargain collective• 
ly .•.. " Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(5). 
T:he duty to bargain is to " ... confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment .... " Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 
61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d). 
8 Chairman Leedom, Members Rodgers and Bean made up the majority. Member 
Murdock dissented. 
4 Financial data generally includes balance sheets, profit and loss statements, declara-
tions of dividends, production costs and other data normally regarded as solely within 
the realm of management. 
5 For an indication of information comprising wage data, see 57 CoL. L. REV. 112 at 
120 (1957). . 
6Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B., 206 (1946), enforcement den. (5th 
Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 662, revd. 337 U.S. 217 (1949). 
7Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), enforced (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. 
(2d) 947. 
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required.8 The different approach used in the present decision on requests 
for financial data reflects several considerations. Financial data may be 
helpful to bargaining, but it is not as relevant to the general bargaining 
process as are wage and employment data.9 Management may feel that the 
company's financial status is solely its concern.10 Even where unfair labor 
practices on the part of employers have been found, the NLRB orders 
have not required them to open their books for inspection.11 In all cases 
that had previously reached the NLRB the defense of inability to pay 
bad already been asserted;12 thus the rule has been that the employer 
must furnish financial information to substantiate his claim of inability 
to pay the wages demanded.13 The present decision implements what 
was implicit in prior decisions by establishing that general relevance of 
the financial data to bargaining is not a sufficient basis for compelling 
such data to be furnished, but that ability to pay must be in issue.u 
The rule seems to strike a desirable balance between the conflicting in-
terests of the employer and the union. The NLRB appreciates that finan-
cial data may be helpful to realistic and successful bargaining,15 but 
considers that the employer may nevertheless be in good faith in refusing 
to supply it. Management has urged that disclosure of financial data can 
cause injuries competitively, provide the union with information useful 
for purposes other than bargaining, and lead to putting management poli-
cies on the bargaining table.16 Of significance also in the principal de-
cision is the holding that regardless of the union's purpose, the produc-
tion and sales information necessarily went to the issue of ability to 
pay. Member Murdock's dissent, based on the grounds that the informa-
s Whitin Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954), enforced (4th Cir. 1954) 217 
F. (2d) 593, cert. den. 349 U.S. 905 (1955). As a union request prior to negotiations cannot 
be said without difficulty to be irrelevant, the view was taken that wage data is relevant 
to collective -bargaining generally. Thus the employer has a duty to furnish such informa-
tion unless it can be shown to be clearly outside the orbit of bargaining or that the 
request -was made for purposes of harassment. 
9Cf. Douglas Silk Products Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 450 (1953). 
10 See generally Barkin, "Financial Statements in Collective Bargaining," 4 LAB. L. 
J. 753 (1953); Sherman, "Employer's Obligation To Produce Data for Collective Bargain-
ing,'' 35 MINN. L. REV. 24 (1950). 
11 Although in wage data cases specific information has ·had to be supplied, the 
NLRB has required only .that the employer substantiate his position of inability to pay 
so that the union is intelligently informed. See Miller, "Employer's Duty To Give Eco-
nomic Data to Union,'' 101 J. AccoUNTANcY 40 (1956); Shair, "A Look at the Books,'' 
6 LAB. L. J. 53 (1955). 
12 E.g., Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.RiB. 1205 (1950); I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 
1263 (1951); Camp 8: Mdnnes, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 524 (1952); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 
351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
13 lbid. Cf. General Counsel Ad. Rul., Case No. K-467, 38 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1956). 
14 Principal case at 1317. 
15lbid. 
16 See 105 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 90 at 99 (1956); Leonard, "NLRB Policy on the Em-
ployer's Duty To Supply Economic Data .for Bargaining," 6 LAB. L. J. 376 (1955). 
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tion was for purposes of determining employee productivity,17 suggests 
some difficulties. One problem is the continuing need for closer defin-
ition of financial data and wage and employment data. Another is the 
necessity for determining when an employer is or is not claiming in-
ability to pay,18 for increased avoidance of this claim is to be anticipated. 
However, as the parties put more faith in collective bargaining, it may be 
hoped that fewer disputes over requested information will arise. 
William H. Leighner, S.Ed. 
17 This is a recognized bargaining factor. Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952). 
18 Compare .the basis for refusal in the Truitt case, note 12 supra, with that of the 
principal case. In the former, the company insisted it was not basing refusal on inability 
to pay but on inability to compete if it granted the increase. In the latter, the employers 
claimed that business conditions did not warrant and could not support the increase in 
costs. See also General Counsel Rul., Case No. 951, 34 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1954). 
